One dark and rainy night, Yuso sexually assaults and tortures Zelan. In escaping from the scene of his crime, he falls heavily and becomes an impotent paraplegic. Instead of treating his fate as divine retribution for his wicked acts, Yuso sees it as sheer bad luck. He shows no remorse for what he has done, and vainly hopes that he will recover his powers, which he now treats as involuntarily hoarded resources to be used on less rainy days. In the (...) presence of others, he pretends that he has turned over a new leaf. He asks for religious and educational books, hoping to make up for his poor education and deprived social background. But he immediately discards them when he is alone in favor of the pornographic magazines which he has bribed a nurse to smuggle in for him. His deception and various obscene acts committed in the hospital are exposed; by the time he comes up for trial, everyone knows that he is still a lustful, sadistic, and unrepentant man. Most retributivists have a sufficient justification for punishing Yuso independently of the social consequences of his punishment. Two features of the case might cause some difficulties. First, Yuso has already experienced considerable suffering and deprivation both before and after his crime, and retributivists might disagree about the relevance of the suffering to his punishment. Secondly, Yuso is unrepentant, and it is unlikely that punishment will change him. This might, as we shall see, create a problem for those who think that the justifying aim of punishment is the moral reform of the offender. (shrink)

In Defense of Utilitarianism, C.L. Sheng provides a more intensive study of the Unified Utilitarian Theory , which he proposed in his previous work A New Approach to Utilitarianism . Sheng defends utilitarianism, particularly UUT, against the objections and attacks raised by nonutilitarians, showing it to be a viable ethical theory.

All students of the classical languages are aware that, in referring to intervals of time, the Greeks and Romans often employed a method of reckoning which was inclusive and consequently different from our own. The Greeks, for example, refer to the period between two celebrations of the Olympic games as a though we should call it a four-year interval. One instance of this kind of usage in Latin is the stereotyped formula employed in expressing a date: ante diem quintum Id. (...) Mai. is 11 May, though we should say that there was an interval of four days only between 11 and 15 May. Another instance is the use of tertiana and quartana as applied to fevers which recur on alternate days and on every third day respectively. The ramifications of this mode of expression are extensive, but I am only concerned here with one, namely the use of quisque with ordinals. (shrink)

“Career value” is the name of a kind of value I used (or perhaps I coined) in my classification of value according to good things in life based on the law of nonreplaceability. I classify value into seven classes: (1) health value, (2) sentimental value, (3) economic value1, (4) belief value, (5) environmental value, (6) social value, and (7) career value. Career value refers to the extra value of the most important work, which one wants to do and actually does (...) in one’s life time, for oneself. In Section 2, I explain the nature of career value, which is different from the natures of all other values. In Section 3, I discuss various career values themselves. Career value has several different forms, depending on the nature and size of career. Finally, I conclude that, except for economic value3, which isunsuitable and unreasonable to be a career value, the pursuit of any kind of a nonmaterial career value is a good thing and conforms to the maximization of social utility in utilitarianism. (shrink)

This volume in the Routledge History of Philosophy series discusses the philosophers belonging to both the `analytical' and `continental' traditions, as well as the now influential American pragmatists. Each chapter is written by a different author who presents the issues in the context of the period when they arose, while also keeping an eye on their relevance to current philosophical interests. A few philosophers are discussed in multiple chapters in different but mutually illuminating contexts.

Organisational change is one of the most frequently recurring organisational phenomena of our time, yet despite this, organisations are not succeeding in instituting change processes effectively; dismal "change success rates" are recorded. Van Tonder and Van Vuuren (2004) have argued that the adoption of an ethical framework from within which change practices are to be approached and "managed", would significantly reduce the negative consequences of change initiatives. As a first step in this direction, the current study set out to establish (...) the meaning that employees attribute to "ethical" and "unethical" change. Data obtained from a sample of 111 respondents from seven companies were subjected to basic content analysis and key themes extracted. The results indicate a limited understanding of ethics concepts among employees. A clear need for both intensified education and research is indicated. (shrink)

Painters are the experts in colour phenomenology. Their business is to use colour to affect our feelings. Psychophysicists are expert in making experimental inferences from behavioural responses to the functional mechanisms of perception. The varying aims of these two groups of people mean that much that is of interest to the one is of little concern to the other. However, in recent times several prominent psychophysicists, such as Floyd Ratliff , Jack Werner and Dorothea Jameson , have thrown much light (...) on painterly practice. Following their lead, I would like to sketch some of the mechanisms that are responsible for many of the features of colour appearance important to the work of visual artists. I will begin with some phenomena that can be accounted for by mechanisms that are reasonably well understood, and then move to phenomena whose underlying basis is less well established. I will conclude with a suggestive experiment and, true to my calling as a philosopher, a piece of downright speculation. (shrink)

On July 3, 1996, in Jones v. United States), the United States District Court for the Northern District of California held that plaintiffs in a wrongful birth action cannot recover costs or damages associated with the birth and upbringing of their daughter absent evidence of causation and proof to satisfy liability requirements. Plaintiffs scientific evidence regarding the alleged interaction between antibiotics and oral contraceptives did not satisfy the Daubertstandard, cert. denied,116 S. Ct. 189 )) for admissibility developed by the Supreme (...) Court. In addition, the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of persuasion on duty of care and causation.On January 16, 1992, Karyn Jones went to a U.S. Army gynecologist, Dr. James Murphy, to obtain a prescription for birth control pills. (shrink)

What ecological advantages do animals gain by being able to detect, extract and exploit wavelength information? What are the advantages of representing that information as hue qualities? The benefits of adding chromatic to achromatic vision, marginal in object detection, become apparent in object recognition and receiving biological signals. It is argued that this improved performance is a direct consequence of the fact that many animals' visual systems reduce wavelength information to combinations of four basic hues. This engenders a simple categorical (...) scheme that permits a rich amount of sensory information to be rapidly and efficiently employed by cognitive machinery of limited capacity. (shrink)

In ‘Of Sensory Systems and the “Aboutness” of Mental States’, Kathleen Akins (1996) argues against what she calls ‘the traditional view’ about sensory systems, according to which they are detectors of features in the environment outside the organism. As an antidote, she considers the case of thermoreception, a system whose sensors send signals about how things stand with themselves and their immediate dermal surround (a ‘narcissistic’ sensory system); and she closes by suggesting that the signals from many sensory systems may (...) not in any familiar sense be about anything at all. Her presentation of the issues, however, overlooks resources available to ‘the traditional view’—or so I shall argue. Akins’s own thumbnail sketch of what is wrong with the traditional view is that it asks, concerning a given sensory system, ‘what is it detecting?’, when we should instead be asking ‘what is it doing?’ (352). Her point is that on the traditional view the function of a sensory system—what it's ‘for’—is to detect or indicate (values of) features of the outside environment. But at least on one version of the traditional view—namely Ruth Millikan’s—this would never be the sole or main proper function of a sensory system. (Akins does not list Millikan as a traditionalist, but Millikan fits squarely Akins’s description of them, since she believes in a naturalistic theory of aboutness and thinks it should begin with the senses.) For Millikan (1989, 1993), the proper function of a sensory system is in the first instance enabling behavioural systems—in the simplest case, motor routines—to perform their proper function. This they do, roughly, by switching on and steering the behavioural routines. Where features of the outside environment come in is as Normal (= assumed-by-the-design) conditions for the successful performance of the sensory system's proper function. That is, the only strategy for switching on and steering that is simple enough for evolution to have hit upon it, and reliable enough for evolution to have liked it, is a strategy which gears the steering to (values of) features of the outside environment. But as soon as one starts fleshing out the details of this story, one notices that they are probably quite different in the case of thermoreception from how they are with ‘distance’ senses such as vision and olfaction--a point which Akins overlooks.. (shrink)

This detailed and sympathetic, but not uncritical, study of On Liberty' argues for the general consistency and coherence of Mill's defence of individual liberty, but maintains that there are significant non-utilitarian elements in his arguments.